Linking and framing copyright material: guidance at last | Practical Law

Linking and framing copyright material: guidance at last | Practical Law

Website owners are now free to link to copyright material on third-party websites as long as the material is freely available and accessible on those other websites, following a significant European Court of Justice decision. The ECJ found that this is so even if the copyright material is “framed” on the linking website and gives the impression that it is part of that website.

Linking and framing copyright material: guidance at last

Practical Law UK Articles 4-558-3665 (Approx. 4 pages)

Linking and framing copyright material: guidance at last

by Andrew Moir, Rachel Montagnon and Heather Newton, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP
Published on 27 Feb 2014European Union, United Kingdom
Website owners are now free to link to copyright material on third-party websites as long as the material is freely available and accessible on those other websites, following a significant European Court of Justice decision. The ECJ found that this is so even if the copyright material is “framed” on the linking website and gives the impression that it is part of that website.
Website owners may now use hyperlinks to link to copyright material on third-party websites as long as the material is freely accessible on those other websites, following the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) significant decision in Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12). The ECJ found that this is the case even if the copyright material is "framed" on the linking website and gives the impression that it is part of that website.

The decision

The ECJ was asked to determine whether providing unauthorised hyperlinks to a third-party website is a "communication to the public" under Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC) (the Directive) (Article 3(1)) (see box "Previous decisions").
The ECJ concluded that:
  • There is a "communication" by making material available to the public in such a way that they may access it (even if they do not actually do so). The users of the website that carries the unauthorised links (the linking website) are a "public" for the purposes of Article 3(1) since they are an indeterminate and large group.
  • However, for there to be a communication to the public (if, like here, the means of communication is not a "different technical means"), that public must be a "new public"; that is, one that was not taken into account by the copyright holders at the time the copyright work was initially published on the internet.
  • There is no new public where, as in Svensson, the linking website carries hyperlinks to journalistic articles on freely accessible third-party websites. In Svensson, the linking website users were already deemed to be users of the third-party websites and therefore part of the public taken into account by the journalists publishing on those third-party websites at the time they posted their copyrighted material.
  • The fact that the material appears to the user to be on the linking website, rather than on the third-party website (known as framing), does not alter this conclusion.
  • The redirection by hyperlinks to material already freely accessible cannot be prevented using the "communication to the public" right under Article 3(1).

Welcome clarification

The decision clarifies that, if a website makes content accessible to a public who could not have accessed it before, then this will be a new public and the use will infringe Article 3(1). For example, hyperlinks would be directed to a new public if their use circumvented restrictions on the third-party website that had been put in place to protect works and restrict public access (for example, on a subscription-only website) since these users would not have been contemplated by the copyright holders when originally posting their works on the third-party website.
However, if the content was already freely accessible to a public with the authorisation of the copyright owner, then there would be no new access being given to the work and, therefore, no new public.
The ECJ also made clear that EU member states do not have the right to give wider protection to copyright holders by broadening the concept of "communication to the public" to construe it to cover a wider range of activities than those referred to in Article 3(1). That would have the effect of creating legislative differences and, accordingly, legal uncertainty, when the Directive is specifically intended to remedy those problems.

Practical significance

The decision will benefit aggregation websites, which provide ease of access to publicly accessible material or the simple use of hyperlinks as references. However, where aggregation websites link to material that is not freely accessible, such as subscription-only websites, this will be infringing. Aggregation websites already use technical measures to prevent access by non-subscribers and, in most cases, the links will simply take non-subscribers to a subscription page, while subscribers will get through to the underlying material. However, these websites will need to take care not to create links that allow circumvention of website access restrictions.
Copyright owners may be surprised by the ECJ's conclusion that framing is not preventable using the Article 3(1) right. However, its decision could be seen as a form of exhaustion of rights where material is posted on the internet without access restrictions and with the authorisation of the copyright holder.
A stumbling block for the application of Svensson may be the definition of the public to whom the initial authorised communication was intended to be made by the copyright owner. This may be a matter of practical fact; that is, whether or not it was freely accessible, which is much easier to determine than the public "contemplated" or "taken into account" by the copyright owner.
However, the ECJ did not comment on a number of questions that may arise; for example, where anti-circumvention measures fail, should the person creating the link to what appears to be a freely accessible website have to bear the consequences? What role is there for website terms and conditions, which often purport to require those accessing the website to seek authorisation for the creation of links to its content? Would such contractual provisions be included in a consideration of what is freely available?
The ECJ did address one problematic issue: the provision of a link to a freely accessible website that later becomes a restricted access website. Once the website or material is restricted, a link to it will be a communication to the public, and would therefore be protected by Article 3(1).

Where next?

For both linking and framing, copyright holders will now need to consider what other avenues there may be for protection. In Svensson, both parties accepted that the hyperlinked articles were freely accessible on the internet. It therefore remains to be seen what "freely accessible" means in practice. While a pay wall should preclude content from being freely accessible, it is less clear whether mere registration to access a website, or limitations placed in a website's terms and conditions, will be sufficient. Copyright owners may also want to consider passing off or unfair competition as avenues to prevent unwanted linking and framing to their material.
Two other cases asking similar questions to those in Svensson have been referred to the ECJ, which may provide further enlightenment in this difficult area (C More Entertainment AB v Sandberg, C-279/13; BestWater International GmbH v Mebes, C-348/13).
The Meltwater reference is also outstanding (Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and others; see News brief "Meltwater and digital copyright: where do we stand?"). This will decide whether the copies made on a computer in the course of browsing are: temporary; transient or incidental; and an integral and essential part of the technological process within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Directive, and therefore non-infringing. If the ECJ decides that they are, there will be few avenues left to copyright holders to prevent simple aggregation, and viewing, of material that has been placed on the internet in a freely accessible form with their authorisation, even if it is later framed within a third-party website.
Andrew Moir is a partner, Rachel Montagnon is a professional support consultant, and Heather Newton is a senior associate in the IP group at Herbert Smith Freehills LLP.

Previous decisions

Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC) provides that communicating to the public a copyright work without the copyright owner's consent is an infringement of copyright. "The public" means an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies a fairly large number of persons (SGAE v Rafael Hotels, C-306/05). For example, where those receiving the communication were a known and limited group (dental patients hearing music in the waiting room), they were held not to qualify as "the public" (SCF v Marco Del Corso, C-135/10; www.practicallaw.com/7-519-1755).
The public must also be a "new public"; that is, one that was not considered by the authors when they authorised the original communication (SGAE; Airfield NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, C-432/09). In ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TV Catchup Ltd, broadcasts were held to have been made to a new public as a different form of technology was used to retransmit the work (C-607/11; see News brief "Live streaming: caught in the copyright net").