Mr Abrams was a member of a limited liability partnership, EAD Solicitors LLP. He set up a limited company, of which he was the sole director and shareholder, to take his place as a member of EAD. Mr Abrams continued to provide his services to EAD through the company, although there was no requirement that the services should be provided by him personally.

The arrangement came to an abrupt end when EAD objected to the company continuing as a member of EAD when Mr Abrams reached the age of 62, the age at which he would have been obliged to retire had he still been a member in his personal capacity. Mr Abrams and the company brought a claim that the company had suffered detriment by reason of Mr Abrams' age.

The EAT held that the company could be discriminated against on the basis that there was nothing in the 2010 Act to suggest that persons who are mistreated must be individuals. The EAT noted that because a person carrying out the discrimination could be a natural or legal person, it followed that the victim of this treatment could, as a strict matter of interpretation, also be a natural or legal person.

The EAT predicted that, following its decision, there could be many scenarios in which companies might complain of discrimination. It included the examples of a company being shunned commercially because it:

The implications extend into various spheres given that the 2010 Act applies to employment, the provision of services, public functions and the disposal of property. As a result, there could be a dramatic increase in the number of cases being brought by companies in the employment tribunal (see box "Employment tribunal caseload"). The decision also raises a number of questions in relation to compensatory awards, service companies and the test for determining whether a particular company is protected by the 2010 Act.

Compensatory awards. In successful discrimination claims, tribunals often make compensatory awards in respect of injury to the claimant's feelings. In 2012, 47% of the total amount of compensation awarded in discrimination cases was awarded for injury to feelings and in 2013, this figure was 43%. The purpose of an injury to feelings award is to compensate the claimant for the anger, upset and humiliation arising from the detriment caused by the discrimination, rather than to punish the respondent (O'Donoghue v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 701).

Companies cannot be angry, upset or humiliated and so it would seem that no injury to feelings awards will be made in respect of this new category of claimant in discrimination claims. However, companies can sue for defamation as the compensation awarded for this is primarily designed to remedy distress and, more relevant for a company, damage to reputation. So while a corporate claimant in a discrimination case will not be able to argue that it has feelings, it may be able to demonstrate that serious damage to its reputation warrants a compensatory award in addition to an award for pecuniary loss.

Service companies. Consultants whose contracts oblige them to perform work personally have always been protected by the 2010 Act. However, EAD Solicitors means that where consultancy is provided through a service company, where there is no requirement for a specific individual to perform work, the service company can now bring a discrimination claim against the client for whom the individual consultant works, provided that the service company can show that the discrimination is because of a protected characteristic belonging to an individual.

As most consultancy arrangements will now fall within the scope of the 2010 Act, this may mean that the provision of consultancy services through a service company is less attractive from the client's perspective. However, these consultancy contracts often require the services of a specific individual, who would always have been protected from discrimination. Taxation and concerns about statutory employment protections are still more likely to drive the way in which consultancy arrangements are set up rather than whether the 2010 Act applies.

The appropriate test. As Mr Abram was the sole director and shareholder of his company, it was a simple question of fact that the company was sufficiently associated with him. But where a company has multiple shareholders, several directors and a large workforce, it may be difficult for a tribunal to determine whether the company is sufficiently associated with an individual with a protected characteristic.

The EAT suggested that a company that is shunned because it offered employment opportunities to those who had specific disabilities may be protected by the 2010 Act, but it is uncertain whether this would still be the case if only a few employees had these specific disabilities. It is also unclear whether the position would change if the company employed a relatively small number of employees with the same protected characteristic but the company was nevertheless well known by the public for doing so.

The difficulty will be in deciding to what extent a critical mass of individuals with the relevant protected characteristic is needed in order to attract the protection of the 2010 Act.

The relationship between the individuals with the protected characteristic and the company might also be an influential factor. Mr Abrams was a director and shareholder and therefore had control over the limited company. However, cases could easily arise where this relationship is less obvious, such as a company that employs a team of entry-level female IT technicians with no power to shape company policy or decisions and claims sex discrimination on the basis that a supermarket terminates its IT maintenance contract because the company assigned this female team to the supermarket's account.

The EAT suggested that a company whose CEO was openly homosexual will also be a person capable of being discriminated against. This raises the questions of whether the seniority of the individual with the protected characteristic makes any difference to whether the company is protected by the 2010 Act; and whether there must be an actual relationship between the company and the individual with the protected characteristic, or whether the respondent's perception of such a link would be enough.