Vodafone AirTouch: A global merger | Practical Law

Vodafone AirTouch: A global merger | Practical Law

A consideration of the tax and practical issues that arose in the merger between UK's Vodafone and US company AirTouch.

Vodafone AirTouch: A global merger

Practical Law UK Articles 7-101-0373 (Approx. 19 pages)

Vodafone AirTouch: A global merger

by David Cheyne and Clodagh Hayes, Linklaters & Alliance
Published on 01 Aug 1999USA
A consideration of the tax and practical issues that arose in the merger between UK's Vodafone and US company AirTouch.
On 15th January, 1999, Vodafone, and AirTouch, leading UK and
US mobile telecommunications companies, announced that they
planned to merge, despite competing interest in AirTouch from
Bell Atlantic and MCI WorldCom. The merger came into effect on
30th June, 1999, creating the world's largest mobile
telecommunications company with a combined market capital of
approximately £77 billion (US$122 billion) and that
operates, either itself or through associates or investments, in
23 countries.
The merger was structured to overcome a number of tax and
practical issues that arise in a large UK/US merger.

Structure

Vodafone (renamed Vodafone AirTouch) is the parent company of
the new group. AirTouch shareholders were offered ordinary shares
in the UK parent in the form of Vodafone AirTouch American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) plus $9 in cash for each of their
shares. As a consequence, Vodafone shareholders owned just over
50%, and AirTouch shareholders just under 50%, of the enlarged
equity share capital of Vodafone AirTouch immediately following
the merger. As indicated below, it was important for US tax
purposes that former AirTouch shareholders (which were US
persons) did not hold more than 50% of the merged company
immediately following the merger.

US tax

In the US, target shareholders incur a taxable gain when
accepting an offer for their shares unless certain exceptions
apply (see inset box "US tax and mergers"). These
exceptions generally relate to certain types of reorganisation
(as defined in section 368, US Internal Revenue Code
1986) and require:
  • The target shareholders to retain equity participation in the
  • acquiring or surviving company.
  • There to be a continuity in the business interest of the
  • target company.
In some cases one company must also control the other (defined
as a 80% ownership (section 368(c), US Internal Revenue Code
1986)). A number of techniques have been established that
take advantage of these exceptions (see inset box "US tax and
mergers").
The Vodafone AirTouch merger used one of these techniques,
known as a reverse triangular merger. The steps involved in this
were as follows:
  • Vodafone established a wholly owned US subsidiary (Merger
  • Sub).
  • Merger Sub merged with AirTouch under the provisions of
  • Delaware law.
  • Merger Sub ceased to exist on the merger becoming effective;
  • AirTouch remained as the surviving corporation.
  • The existing shares of common stock in AirTouch were
  • cancelled and converted into the right to receive ordinary shares
  • in Vodafone plus $9 in cash.
  • AirTouch (as the surviving corporation) issued an equivalent
  • number of shares to Vodafone as were cancelled.
  • Vodafone (now Vodafone AirTouch) issued Vodafone AirTouch
  • shares (through the ADR facility) to the holders of the cancelled
  • AirTouch shares.
(See inset box "Structure of the merger")
This effectively allowed the US shareholder to defer taxable
gains arising on the share element of the offer until they sell
the offer shares (sections 354, 356, 368(a)(1)(A) and
368(a)(2)(E), US Internal Revenue Code 1986). They still had
to pay any taxable gains to the extent that they received
cash.
Whilst the reverse triangular structure is relatively common
in the US, there were additional complications that had to be
addressed in this case: the enfranchisement of non-voting
AirTouch preferred stock, the foreign corporation rules and UK
legal and tax issues.
AirTouch's preferred stock. Prior to the
merger becoming effective, AirTouch undertook an internal
reorganisation which amended its certificate of incorporation to
satisfy requirements to permit the merger to be tax free to US
holders of AirTouch shares, except with respect to cash received
in the merger. The effect of the internal reorganisation was to
give voting rights to certain classes of preferred shares and to
increase the dividends payable on certain other classes.
Foreign corporations. As a general rule, if
there is a foreign buyer the transaction cannot benefit from the
reorganisation exemptions ­ the transaction remains a
taxable exchange (section 367a, US Internal Revenue Code
1986). These provisions are designed to prevent US assets
being moved outside of the US tax jurisdiction. However,
cross-border transactions which would otherwise qualify can
benefit from the exemptions (section 367(a)(2), US Inland
Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations issued in 1996 and
clarified in 1998) if certain further conditions are
satisfied. These include the target satisfying certain
information reporting requirements, and the merger not resulting
in more than 50% of the shares in the new foreign parent being
held by former target shareholders who are US persons. All of the
target's shareholders are presumed to be US persons unless they
swear an affidavit to the contrary. In addition, target
shareholders that own 5% or more of the stock will only qualify
for non-recognition if they enter into a gain recognition
agreement (by which the shareholder effectively agrees to pay tax
on any gain if it sells the buyer's shares before the end of the
fifth tax year of the transfer).
In particular, the "active trade or business test" must be
satisfied so that, amongst other things, the fair market value of
the bidder must be at least equal to the fair market value of the
target at the time of the merger (that is, completion). In this
case, a private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue was
obtained confirming that Vodafone would be "substantially in
compliance" with the active business test at completion. The
merger agreement provided for the consideration to be adjusted if
either the private letter ruling was not obtained and/or the 50%
test was not satisfied. Such adjustments included the cash part
of the price being increased and the share part reduced so that
the merger would fall within the published regulations (see
"Merger agreement" below).
UK legal and tax issues. The reverse
triangular structure potentially raised a number of UK legal and
tax issues:
  • Merger relief. If shares are issued at a
  • premium a sum equal to the premium must be transferred to share
  • premium account (section 130, Companies Act 1985).
  • However, there is an exemption for mergers (section 131)
  • where the company issuing shares (in this case Vodafone) has
  • acquired 90% of each class of equity shares in the other company
  • (AirTouch) in pursuance of an arrangement where the consideration
  • for the issue of the shares by Vodafone is the issue or transfer
  • by AirTouch of equity shares or the cancellation of such
  • shares.
In this case merger relief was not available because AirTouch
had an outstanding class of convertible preference shares which
were not being acquired by Vodafone. These shares are considered
to be equity shares for the purposes of the Companies Act so
Vodafone could not acquire 90% of each class of equity share
capital.
  • Valuations of non-cash consideration. Where
  • non-cash consideration is paid for the issue of shares, the
  • company's auditors must prepare a valuation report unless an
  • exemption applies (section 103, Companies Act 1985). A
  • report is not required where there is an arrangement for an
  • allotment of shares by the company on terms that the whole or
  • part of the consideration for the shares allotted is to be
  • provided by the transfer to the company (or the cancellation) of
  • all or some of the shares in another company (section
  • 103(3)). This was satisfied, as part of the consideration
  • for the allotment of Vodafone shares was the cancellation by the
  • AirTouch shareholders of the AirTouch shares.
  • Treasury consent. It is unlawful for a UK
  • company to cause or permit a non-UK resident company which it
  • controls to create or issue shares or transfer or cause or permit
  • the transfer of shares or debentures in a non-UK resident company
  • without the consent of the Treasury (section 765, Income and
  • corporation Taxes Act 1998). This provision is designed to
  • stop assets being removed from the UK tax jurisdiction to avoid
  • tax but can catch other transactions such as this one, so
  • obtaining Treasury consent to the merger was made a condition of
  • the transaction (see "UK/US mergers", PLC, 1998, IX(2), 17
  • for a more detailed discussion).

Other tax structures

As mentioned there are other tax-efficient structures (see
inset box "US tax and mergers"). However, the reverse
triangular structure was preferable because:
  • A simple statutory merger was not possible cross border.
  • The forward triangular merger would have been possible but
  • would have involved AirTouch dissolving and its assets being
  • transferred to Merger Sub. This is less satisfactory from a legal
  • point of view. Given that the cash element was relatively small
  • (less than 20% of the total consideration), the parties did not
  • need to use the forward triangular merger structure.
  • The share for share exemption with no cash element was not
  • possible because, amongst other things, former AirTouch
  • shareholders which were US persons had to hold less than 50% of
  • the shares following the merger to satisfy the foreign company
  • tax issues discussed above.

Appraisal rights

Under Delaware law shareholders involved in certain mergers
have the right to apply to the court to have the offer price
reviewed and to be paid the fair value of their shares
(section 262, Delaware General Corporation Law). This
can delay the offer and, in complicated offers like this one,
affect the percentages upon which the tax and accounting
treatment depends. In this offer, AirTouch shareholders had
appraisal rights.

ADRs

In UK/US mergers the acquiring UK company typically issues
equity consideration in the form of ADRs. For US investors, ADRs
have the advantages of being transferable without a charge to UK
stamp duty or stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT) and of being in large
denominations similar to US equity securities (for example, one
Vodafone AirTouch ADR represents 10 Vodafone AirTouch ordinary
shares). (For further information on ADRs and GDRs see also
"Buying into the American dream", EC, 1997, II(7), 43
and "GDRs: Reaching international investors", PLC, 1995, VI(2), 31.)
Using ADRs raised two issues:
SDRT. The consequence of issuing new shares
to an ADR depository is a 1.5% charge to SDRT payable by the
issuer (section 93, Finance Act 1986) unless the offer
can be structured in such a way as to fall within certain
exceptions. The Vodafone AirTouch merger was structured in such a
way as to avoid SDRT (see inset box "ADRs and SDRT").
Amongst other things this structure required Vodafone AirTouch's
shares to be redenominated in dollars.
Enfranchisement of ADR holders. The
consequence of ADRs is that the ADR holder cannot vote directly
­ the ADR holder has to act through the depositary or the
depositary's proxy. Prior to the merger, the rights of proxies to
speak and vote at general meetings were restricted (as is usually
the case with UK public companies) to demanding and voting only
on a poll, which would have affected the ADR holders.
As a result of the merger, Vodafone altered the voting and
other rights of proxies in general and more particularly, as they
relate to ADR holders. The Articles of Association of Vodafone
AirTouch were amended to provide as follows:
  • Proxies would have the right to attend, vote and speak at
  • general meetings of the company. The depositary could therefore
  • appoint the ADR holder as its proxy so that the holder could
  • attend the meeting.
  • Proxies appointed by approved depositaries would have the
  • right to appoint others as their proxies (whether the depository
  • or third parties), in effect putting ADR holders in the same
  • place on the appointment of proxies as ordinary
  • shareholders.
  • Special and extraordinary resolutions would only be approved
  • on a poll. This was required as multiple proxies are not regarded
  • as separate members. Thus proxies voting on a show of hands would
  • not be effective for the purpose of section 378(1) of the
  • Companies Act 1985 which provides that three quarters of members
  • have to approve an extraordinary resolution. Section 378(2)
  • provides that the same restrictions also apply to special
  • resolutions. If multiple proxies were allowed to vote on a show
  • of hands, it would not be possible to determine whether three
  • quarters of members had approved the resolution.

Redenomination

It was agreed to redenominate Vodafone AirTouch's ordinary
share capital into US dollars. This was proposed because a
significant proportion of Vodafone AirTouch ordinary shareholders
will be resident in the US, a substantial part of the company's
assets will be US dollar assets and a significant proportion of
its revenues will be in US dollars. In addition, as a consequence
of this redenomination, the merger could be structured in a
manner likely to eliminate the potential SDRT charge on the issue
of shares to AirTouch shareholders, resulting in a saving of over
£450 million.
The steps involved in the redenomination were as follows:
  • A reduction of capital (section 135, Companies Act
  • 1985) whereupon all the issued ordinary shares of 5p each in
  • Vodafone were cancelled. This reduction required approval by the
  • shareholders and the High Court.
  • The sum arising as a result of the cancellation was credited
  • to a special reserve and converted into US dollars at a
  • prescribed exchange rate.
  • The reserve was then applied in paying up newly created
  • dollar shares of US$0.10.
  • To the extent the reserve was insufficient to pay up the
  • dollar shares, the share premium account was to be capitalised to
  • pay up the necessary amount.
There is a potential issue for UK companies redenominating
their share capital into a currency other than sterling. UK
public limited companies must have a minimum share capital of at
least £50,000 (section 117, Companies Act 1985).
Vodafone therefore needed to create a new class of shares with an
aggregate nominal value of £50,000 to fulfil this
requirement. These shares were issued to one of the company's
bankers.
(See also "Foreign currency share capital", PLC, 1993, IV(10), 23)

Merger agreement and deal protection

The merger was initiated by a merger agreement between the two
companies which was subject to US law (a copy of the agreement
appears in Appendix A of the AirTouch proxy statement).
The merger agreement set out the main terms of the merger and
the detailed procedures to be followed in implementing the
reverse triangular merger and the internal reorganisations. It
also contained representations and warranties given by each party
to the other and provisions designed to protect the deal by
imposing break fees if the agreement was terminated.
Although such agreements are a feature of US transactions,
they are uncommon in UK public bids, where neither party would
typically receive any representations and warranties nor have
termination rights or break fees.
Termination rights. This agreement provided
that either company could terminate the merger agreement in
certain circumstances including if:
  • The merger had not been completed by 1st March, 2000.
  • A government order had permanently prevented the merger.
  • The approval of the shareholders of either company was not
  • received.
  • The other party entered into negotiations with another person
  • in relation to an acquisition offer by that person or that
  • party's board recommended such a proposal.
  • The board or the other party withdrew or adversely modified
  • its recommendation of the merger.
  • There was a material breach of covenant or warranty by the
  • other party.
Termination payments. In addition to the
right to terminate the transaction, Vodafone and AirTouch agreed
that termination payments would be payable by the parties in
certain circumstances. The purpose of this was to secure the
transaction and discourage either party from entering into
negotiations with a third party.
In essence, AirTouch agreed to make a payment to Vodafone of
up to US$1 billion if the merger agreement was terminated in the
following circumstances:
  • AirTouch failed to obtain shareholder approval of the merger
  • at a time when a third party had made an alternative
  • proposal.
  • The directors of AirTouch withdrew or adversely amended their
  • approval of the merger or failed to confirm such recommendation
  • when so requested.
  • AirTouch recommended to its shareholders an alternative
  • proposal by a third party.
In the event of a termination based on the failure to obtain
shareholder approval in other circumstances, the termination
payment would have been limited to US$225 million, with an
additional US$775 million payable to Vodafone only if AirTouch
entered into an agreement for an alternative transaction within
one year of the termination.
Similarly, Vodafone agreed to make a payment to AirTouch of up
to US$225 million if the transaction had been terminated for
identical reasons relating to Vodafone and in the same
circumstances. However, Vodafone would also have had to make this
payment if its shareholders had failed to approve the merger at
its EGM.
Termination fees are fairly common in mergers between US
corporations but are less usual in transactions relating to UK
companies. They raise a number of issues under English company
law, including whether the directors are acting in breach of
their fiduciary duties or fettering their powers by agreeing to
the payment, and whether the agreement to pay such fees
constitutes financial assistance. (For detailed article see
"Break fees: keeping the parties at the table" PLC, 1998, IX(11), 9). In addition, the Takeover Panel has recently issued
a statement (1999/10) requiring such fees to be de
minimis (normally less than 1% of the offer value) in bids
subject to the Takeover Code (see Bulletin, Mergers and
Acquisitions, this issue, page 82).
Care must also be taken to ensure the size of the break fee
does not result in the agreement to pay it constituting a Class I
transaction, thereby requiring shareholder consent to entering
into the agreement.

Other key features

Management. The parties agreed that the new
Vodafone AirTouch would have a board of 14 directors, seven from
Vodafone and seven from AirTouch. There were to be six executive
directors, four from Vodafone and two from AirTouch, with the
chief executive being Chris Gent. In addition, a number of key
officers were agreed at the time of announcement of the
transaction.
Accounting for the merger. Vodafone will
account for the merger using the acquisition method of accounting
under UK accounting rules. This will result in a goodwill
amortisation charge of approximately £2 billion per annum
for a number of years after the merger, thereby reducing the
reported consolidated profit of Vodafone AirTouch.
Vodafone has to account for the merger in this way because it
did not satisfy the merger accounting requirements under UK
rules. In particular, the fact that AirTouch shareholders would
receive some cash meant that Vodafone could not comply with the
requirement that the fair value of any consideration other than
equity shares given pursuant to the arrangement by the parent
company and its subsidiary undertakings should not exceed 10% of
the nominal value of the equity shares issued (paragraph
10(1)(c), Schedule 4A, Companies Act, 1985). Vodafone's
existing ordinary shares had a nominal value of only 5p and the
cash amount payable to AirTouch shareholders greatly exceeded 10%
of the nominal value of all the ordinary shares issued to Air
Touch shareholders. (For further information see "Accounting
for acquisitions", PLC, 1999, X(2), 7.)
Dividends. It was agreed that Vodafone
AirTouch would continue to announce dividends on Vodafone
AirTouch ordinary shares in sterling. Vodafone AirTouch ordinary
shareholders will continue to be paid their dividends in sterling
whereas Vodafone AirTouch ADS holders will receive their
dividends in dollars. Vodafone has historically paid an interim
and final dividend while AirTouch had never paid a dividend.
Financing. In order to finance the cash
portion of the consideration, Vodafone entered into a $10.5
billion term and revolving credit facility.

Implementing the merger

Shareholder approvals. The merger was a class
1 transaction for Vodafone under London Stock Exchange (LSE)
Listing Rules and consequently required shareholder approval by
an ordinary resolution. In addition, special resolutions were
required to approve the redenomination, the change of name of
Vodafone to Vodafone AirTouch and to amend the Articles of
Association. A class 1 circular and listing particulars were
prepared and sent to all Vodafone shareholders.
The merger also required approval by AirTouch shareholders by
a simple majority. A proxy statement (under section 14A,
Securities and Exchange Act 1934) was sent to all AirTouch
shareholders. The proxy statement is a detailed statement of the
terms of the merger (much like a prospectus) with a proxy card
asking the shareholder to vote to approve the merger. This proxy
statement was included in the Form F-4 Registration Statement.
This document was confidentially pre-filed with the SEC. The SEC
has recently implemented a plain English campaign and now
requires such registration statements to be written in plain
English.
Summary listing particulars for Vodafone AirTouch were also
included in the Form F-4 and sent to AirTouch shareholders as
required by the LSE Listing Rules (Rule 8.15). Separate
meetings of some of the preferred stockholders also had to be
held to approve the internal reorganisation, requiring their own
proxy statement.
Timetable. As mentioned above, the merger was
completed over five months after signing. The sequence of events
to be satisfied prior to closing was particularly complicated. As
well as ensuring that documents to shareholders were distributed
at the same time after regulatory approval processes of differing
lengths with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
LSE, shareholder meetings had to be arranged, dates booked with
the High Court for the reduction of capital and antitrust
approvals sought.
Consents. A number of consents were required
and were made conditions to the merger proceeding, including:
  • Antitrust. The approval of the Federal
  • Communications Commission of the US (FCC) under the
  • Communications Act and the European Commission under the EC
  • Merger Regulation were required before the merger went ahead. The
  • Commission approved the merger after a Phase 1 Investigation.
  • Undertakings were given to divest certain operations in Germany,
  • the only country where Vodafone's and AirTouch's operations
  • overlapped. The FCC process took longer, with the merger
  • receiving approval on 22nd June, 1999.
  • Shareholders approvals. The approvals
  • mentioned above being successfully obtained.
  • Treasury consent. Treasury approval was
  • required as part of the reverse triangular merger (see
  • above).
  • Listing. Listing of the new Vodafone
  • AirTouch ordinary shares on the LSE and the effectiveness of
  • filings with the SEC.
  • US State approvals. Various US state
  • regulations approvals or notifications were required from state
  • public commissions.
  • US tax opinions. Opinions having been
  • received that the merger satisfied the conditions required to
  • obtain tax-free status.
David Cheyne and Clodagh Hayes, Linklaters &
Alliance.
Vodafone's in house legal team on the transaction, led by
Stephen Scott, Company Secretary, included Nick Godwin, Legal
Director - Europe and Helen Drake, Senior Solicitor. Vodafone
were advised as to English and German law by Linklaters &
Alliance, with David Cheyne, Sarah Wiggins and Clodagh Hayes in
corporate, Conor Hurley in Tax, Clare Moulder in banking, Robyn
Durie in telecoms, Tony Morris and Sonya McNulty in competition,
Graham Rowlands-Hempel in share schemes and Uli Wolff from
Oppenhoff & Rädler. Vodafone were advised as to US law
by Sullivan & Cromwell, with Ben Stapleton, George Sampas and
Kathryn Campbell in corporate and Willard Taylor and Ron Creamer
in Tax.
AirTouch's in house legal team on the transaction, led by
Margaret Gill, Senior Vice President, Legal and External Affairs
and Secretary, included Sharon Le Duy, Senior Counsel and Megan
Pierson. AirTouch were advised as to US law by Fried Frank,
Harris Shriver & Jacobson, with Charles Nathan and Steve
Steinman in corporate and Alan Kaden in tax. AirTouch were
advised as to English law by Freshfields, with Will Lawes, Jamie
Barr and Hugh Corroon in corporate.

US tax and mergers

In the US, a sale of shares in or assets of a company is
generally a chargeable transfer that will result in a tax charge
on any capital gain realised. But if the acquisition is
structured as a tax-free reorganisation then:
  • Target shareholders do not recognise a gain or loss on
  • receiving shares in the buyer in exchange for their shares
  • (section 354 and section 355, US Internal Revenue Code
  • 1986) but generally have the same tax base in the new shares
  • as in their surrendered shares. This effectively defers tax on
  • the share portion of the offer until they sell the buyer's
  • shares. The target shareholder will be taxed (either as a capital
  • gain or as dividend income in some cases)on any gain on the
  • shares to the extent that it receives cash or other property
  • under the offer.
  • The corporations involved will generally not recognise a gain
  • or loss on any assets or shares transferred under the arrangement
  • (sections 361 and 362, US Internal Revenue Code 1986).
  • The buyer will generally take any assets or stock at the target's
  • historic base cost.
The tax-free reorganisations (defined in sections 368, 361
and section 362, US Internal Revenue Code 1986) generally
require there to be a continuity of interest between the old and
new companies:
  • The target shareholders must retain equity stock in the
  • acquiring or surviving company ­ usually representing 40-50%
  • of the price (US Treasury Regulations: Regs. Sec. 1.368-1(b);
  • Prop. Reg. Sec. 1.3688-2(e)(1996)).
  • The business of the company must continue or its assets
  • continue to be used (US Treasury Regulations: Regs. Sec.
  • 1.368-1(d)(1996)).
In some cases one company must also control the other (defined
as a 80% ownership (section 368(c), US Internal Revenue Code
1986).
The most typical forms of reorganisation used to gain this
beneficial tax treatment are as follows:

Share for share exchanges

(Reorganisation under section 368(a)(1)(B), US Internal
Revenue Code 1986)
Target shareholders exchange their shares for voting shares in
the buyer (or the buyer's 80% parent). No cash or non-voting
shares may be offered. This requirement is strict and the
exchange can lose the exemption if there are pre-arranged
dividends occurring at the time of the merger, if there are
previous cash acquisitions or if fractional entitlements are not
handled properly.
But it can be used by foreign buyers, or where the buyer holds
over 20% of the target already so would not qualify for the
reverse triangular structure. Buyers with over 80% of the company
can also use it to make creeping acquisitions (there is no
requirement to surrender control as with the reverse triangular
merger).

Statutory merger

(Reorganisation under section 368(a)(1)(A), US Internal
Revenue Code 1986)
The target merges into the buyer using the procedures in
applicable state law (in Delaware this would be section 251,
Delaware General Corporation Law). Thus foreign mergers do
not qualify. Buyer stock must be a significant proportion of the
offer price (generally 40-50% of the offer to satisfy the
continuity of interest requirement) but it can be non-voting or
preferred stock so long as it is not redeemable.
The merger is effectively treated like an asset sale from the
target ­ the advantage is that the transfer of assets takes
place in bulk under statute rather than requiring individual
transfers. The target's tax group ceases, which may create some
difficulties.

Forward triangular merger

(Reorganisation under section 368(a)(1)(A) and section
368(a)(2)(D), US Internal Revenue Code 1986)
The target is merged into a new US subsidiary using the
statutory merger procedures and ceases to exist following the
merger. Shares in the target are cancelled, with shareholders
receiving a right to shares in the buyer in return. In exchange
for issuing these shares, the buyer is issued more shares in the
new target.
The merger must qualify for tax-free status as a
straightforward statutory merger, and the same considerations
apply as to such a merger. The buyer also has to:
  • Own 80% or more of the new subsidiary and shareholders cannot
  • get shares in that subsidiary, which means that preference shares
  • will have to be redeemed or reissued by the buyer.
  • Acquire substantially all of the assets of the business,
  • which can cause problems if a disposal is planned immediately
  • following the acquisition.
  • There can also be technical difficulties where the buyer owns
  • shares in the target before the reorganisation.
The advantage with this type of reorganisation is that 50-60%
of the consideration can be in cash, as in the case with the
statutory merger, but a parent's shares can be offered as
consideration, which includes a foreign buyer if it satisfies the
foreign company requirements (see below).

Reverse triangular merger

(Reorganisation under section 368(a)(1)(A) and section
238(a)(2)(E), US Internal Revenue Code 1986)
Here the new subsidiary is dissolved as part of the merger
­ this means that the target continues to exist.
Once again, the statutory merger requirements have to be
satisfied and the target has to retain substantially all of its
assets. But each class of target shareholders also has to give up
control (80%) in exchange only for the buyer's voting shares.
Thus:
  • The buyer has to acquire 80% or more of the company if it
  • offers only shares.
  • A maximum of 20% of the consideration can be in cash or
  • generally in anything other than voting shares.
  • Non-voting preferred shares have to be redeemed or exchanged
  • for voting shares.
The advantage with this structure is that the target continues
to exist. By using a US subsidiary a foreign party can also take
advantage of these type of reorganisation if it meets the foreign
company requirements.

Other

Other techniques are available to achieve tax-free
mergers:
  • A new holding company for both buyer and target can be
  • created (using the reorganisation provisions in section 351,
  • US Internal Revenue Code 1986).
  • Dual listed company structures can be used by foreign buyers
  • in cross-border businesses by retaining the former parent company
  • in each jurisdiction but effectively merging them together at
  • subsidiary level (see "US/UK mergers: Structures and tax", PLC, 1998, IX(2), 17, and "When two heads are better than one", EC, 1999, IV(5), 25).
There is an asset for voting shares tax-free reorganisation,
either by the buyer acquiring the assets directly or in a
triangular structure by using a subsidiary (section
368(a)(1)(C), US Internal Revenue Code 1986).
Unlike the usual statutory merger reorganisation, a foreign
company can acquire the assets in exchange for its shares. But
the cash element is limited (usually less than 20% because
liabilities are regarded as other property) and there needs to be
an asset purchase which is more difficult practically.
Various elections are possible where there are private
acquisitions which affect the tax position of the parties
(see "Cross border acquisitions: structuring the deal to
reduce your US tax bill", EC, 1998, III(10), 35).

Foreign companies

As pointed out in the main article (see "US tax"),
the general rule is that a transaction involving a foreign
corporation cannot benefit from the tax-free reorganisation
provisions (section 367a, US Internal Revenue Code
1986). But a transaction involving a foreign corporation,
which would otherwise qualify as a reorganisation can still do so
in certain circumstances, as outlined in the article (US
Treasury Regulations: Regs. Sec. 1.367-a(2) (1996 and confirmed
in 1998)).
This effectively adds an extra set of conditions that need to
be satisfied where there is a non-US buyer

ADRs and SDRT

The share consideration payable to AirTouch shareholders was
agreed to be paid in ADRs. The placing of underlying shares in an
ADR depository was structured so as to fall outside the charge to
stamp duty reserve tax (SDRT).

The SDRT charge

SDRT was introduced to ensure that transfers of securities are
liable to duty even where there is no instrument of transfer that
would attract a stamp duty charge. SDRT at the rate of 0.5% is
payable in relation to agreements to transfer chargeable
securities where there is no instrument of transfer which is
stampable. Special rules apply where securities are transferred
into or issued to a depository receipt scheme. In these
circumstances SDRT is charged at 1.5% (section 93, Finance
Act 1986).

The exceptions

Until January 1999, the issue or transfer of certain bearer
instruments (including bearer shares issued by a UK company) into
a depository scheme did not bear duty unless the instrument was a
short term renouncable letter of allotment. Instead, the issue of
a bearer instrument was liable to a separate duty of 1.5%.
But the bearer instrument duty does not apply where such
shares are denominated in a non-UK currency (section 30,
Finance Act 1967). Thus a company transferring shares to a
depository could avoid both the SDRT and bearer instrument charge
by redenominating its share capital into a foreign currency and
by issuing the consideration shares to the ADR depository in
bearer form (see also "Foreign currency share capital", PLC, 1993, IV(10), 23).
In January 1999, the Inland Revenue announced that this
exemption was no longer to be available in connection with a
takeover or a merger except where the issue of the bearer shares
gave effect to an agreement for a company merger or takeover
entered into in writing before 30th January, 1999 (PLC, 1999, X(2), 12 and PLC, 1999, X(2), 85). As Vodafone entered into its merger agreement on
15th January, it was still able to take advantage of this
provision by redenominating its shares into dollars and issuing
them to the depositary in bearer form.

Further diagrams

The following diagrams are available in the PDF version of this article:
  • Structure of the merger

Web site links

AirTouch proxy statement
Securities and Exchange Commission
FreeEdgar database
Internal Revenue Code
Office of the Law Revision counsel (US House of Representatives
Site)
Legal Information Institute of the University of Cornell
Treasury regulations
Inland Revenue Service