The OECD’s action plan on BEPS: a taxing problem | Practical Law

The OECD’s action plan on BEPS: a taxing problem | Practical Law

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has published an ambitious action plan to tackle areas of perceived weakness in the current international tax regime. The plan was commissioned by the G20 due to widespread unease over the level of tax being paid by multinational enterprises, and addresses concerns over base erosion and profit shifting.

The OECD’s action plan on BEPS: a taxing problem

Practical Law UK Articles 0-538-9745 (Approx. 4 pages)

The OECD’s action plan on BEPS: a taxing problem

by Louise Higginbottom, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP
Published on 29 Aug 2013International, United Kingdom
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has published an ambitious action plan to tackle areas of perceived weakness in the current international tax regime. The plan was commissioned by the G20 due to widespread unease over the level of tax being paid by multinational enterprises, and addresses concerns over base erosion and profit shifting.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published an ambitious action plan to tackle areas of perceived weakness in the current international tax regime.
The plan was commissioned by the G20 due to widespread unease over the level of tax being paid by multinational enterprises (MNEs), and addresses concerns over base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) (see box "What is BEPS?").

Scope of the plan

The plan does not propose any fundamental changes; for example, it does not suggest a change in the current basic methodology for allocating international taxing rights between jurisdictions, or an end to tax deductions for interest.
It recognises that there is no objection, in principle, to the fact that globalisation gives businesses the opportunity to locate their processes in jurisdictions where a favourable tax result can be obtained, even if this is remote from the location of the customers.
However, the plan identifies 15 action points and, if these were to be followed through in full, MNEs would need to re-examine their current structures and processes to determine whether change is needed.

Issues of globalisation

The action points can be split into two broad categories. The first category seeks to address some of the features where globalisation may enable companies to take advantage of international tax arbitrages. These proposals cover the following:
  • Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy. The fiscal authorities appear to be behind the curve in understanding how the digital economy operates in terms of the features that drive profitability, and therefore they are not allocating value to different activities correctly. A study is proposed to examine this further.
  • Neutralising the effects of debt mismatching; for example, where certain instruments can be treated as generating (tax deductible) interest in the payer jurisdiction but (tax exempt) dividends in the recipient jurisdiction.
  • Strengthening controlled foreign company (CFC) rules in the jurisdiction of the (high tax) ultimate parent. Under CFC rules, the profits of a low tax subsidiary are taxed as they accrue, as opposed to when they are distributed. They can disincentivise the use of low taxed intermediate subsidiaries and local tax minimisation, as there is no point in reducing taxes at the local level if the parent jurisdiction is taxing profits as they arise. For example, the absence of an effective CFC regime in the US iscompanies to minimise their non-US taxes globally and retain profits outside the US.
  • Developing limitations on the use of intra-group interest payments; for example, where the corresponding receipt is taxed at a low rate and the amount of debt is excessive compared to the overall external debt levels of a group, or where the debt is used to generate deferred or exempt income.
  • Evaluating the preferential regimes that are offered in some jurisdictions for particular income sources (for example, intangibles such as the "patent box" regime introduced by a number of European countries, including the UK (see feature article "Patent boxes: making the most of the new regime"). In particular, the degree of substance required locally in the relevant jurisdiction in order to benefit from the preferential regime will be examined by the OECD in conjunction with non-OECD members.
  • Preventing multiple layer conduit structures that potentially enable tax treaty abuse in relation to global supply chains; for example, where a conduit company does not have real economic involvement in a transaction chain.
  • Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment (PE) status. Profits from sales to customers in a jurisdiction are normally only taxed if the vendor has a PE. Where a "commissionaire" structure (as opposed to distributor structure) is used, there will normally be no local PE. This is because under such arrangements the contracts are made outside the jurisdiction of the sale (and so are not taxed there), even though staff of a local subsidiary may be involved in organising the sale. Another exemption from the PE rules is for local warehouses: in the digital world, the ability for goods to be delivered promptly to local customers is essential, and therefore the historic exemption will be reconsidered to see whether it is still valid in today's market.
  • Devising alternative methodologies to ensure that, in the context of transfer pricing, profit is allocated fairly between different jurisdictions. Identifying a proper price is difficult in a number of transfer pricing situations, in particular:
    • intangibles (especially in relation to cost sharing arrangements);
    • allocation of risk and capital; and
    • transactions where an MNE conducts activities between related companies that would never be undertaken by unrelated third parties.

A bigger picture

The second category of change is designed to ensure that international fiscal authorities are better able to understand structures and work together in getting a full picture of an MNE's activities. The measures proposed are:
  • Collecting and analysing data relating to BEPS.
  • Ensuring taxpayer transparency, possibly including mandatory disclosure rules for "international tax schemes".
  • Including in the requirement to substantiate transfer pricing methodologies an obligation to disclose global allocation of income, economic activity and taxes paid, based on a common template.
  • Reviewing constraints on mutual agreement procedures and arbitration, which inhibit fiscal authorities acting in a joined-up manner.
  • Developing a multinational instrument to effect changes to tax treaties, obviating the need for each agreement to be amended unilaterally. This measure is proposed due to the inherent difficulty in implementing changes to international tax rules, even once a consensus has been reached on what changes are to be made.

A heady ambition

The plan is ambitious, both in what it seeks to address, and in the timeline proposed; that is, a two-year implementation plan, with the normal G20 process being widened to include other jurisdictions to enable greater international consensus to be achieved. In practice, while there is a strong international consensus that "something needs to be done", it is likely that achieving a consensus on what that thing is will be more challenging.
Some areas are likely to represent fairly "easy wins" for the OECD; for example, changes that can be effected by amending the current OECD guidance on:
  • Related party finance arrangements.
  • Transfer pricing for intangibles.
  • OECD requirements for documents to include transfer pricing strategy documents.
Also, it is likely that a requirement for MNEs to give greater transparency and disclosure of tax planning structures will not be contentious, and is therefore likely to be implemented.
However, some of the measures proposed require a much greater degree of international co-operation and it may be that, ultimately, national self-interest will prevent some of the more ambitious proposals being realised.
Louise Higginbottom is Head of Tax Europe, Middle East and Asia at Norton Rose Fulbright LLP.

What is BEPS?

Base erosion describes arrangements which reduce the level of taxable profits in a jurisdiction (for example, through the payments of fees and royalties). Profit shifting means moving the profit on an activity, such as the use of intangible rights, from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax one. These tax planning strategies can result in companies reducing significantly their overall tax liability.